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Abstract 
The article critically analyses the debate that has so far involved the Big Data phenomenon. The different 
theoretical arguments concerning the potential benefits and the adverse effects that can be produced by 
the aggregation and use of large volumes of data are addressed. In assessing the different perspectives 
in terms of competition law, consumer and privacy protection, specific emphasis is placed on the most 
significant decision-making practice. In particular, as to the merger control, the Google/DoubleClick 
and Facebook/WhatsApp cases are scrutinized as to test, at the enforcement level, the most challenging 
domains. 
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  1 
Introduction 
Over the last few years, the adoption of business models based on the collection, processing and use of 
large volumes of data has certainly contributed to shape the world, at least the digital one. The 
information obtained through different methods of data analysis has undoubtedly acquired a strategic 
role in the decision-making processes and in the same competition discourse. It is clear that an economy 
based on the availability of this resource allows to offer better products and services, fine-tune business 
proposals, achieve internal efficiencies, increase the level of innovation and, more generally, might 
contribute in terms of overall growth. As known, however, all these effects similarly raise a number of 
concerns in terms of market competition, privacy and consumers protection.  
On these and other crucial issues the academic debate has been largely focused, drowning the attention 
from scholars with different backgrounds which have contributed to correctly frame several crucial 
profiles. Nevertheless, the approaches followed and assessments that have emerged still display a 
marked divergence, in almost all the relevant areas. The occurrence of a new phenomenon, of a not yet 
far-reaching understanding of its dynamics, in addition to the different scholarly perspectives, make the 
whole picture not yet clearly readable. Furthermore, the lack of a settled ‘black letter’ law does not help 
to make this research theme more intelligible.  
For these and other reasons, it is maybe useful to critically review the debate that has taken place around 
Big Data, emphasizing the aspects that are somehow broadly endorsed at the theoretical level. 
Hereinafter, much of the attention is given to the enforcement, especially in terms of merger control, in 
both the US and UE. The aim is to assess whether the theoretical story that has been told so far is (or is 
not) reliable.  
Big Data: a complex «new currency» 
The fact that information, obtained processing large amounts of data, represents an asset of the market 
economies is not a new phenomenon. Several studies in the field of information economy have widely 
analysed its value as a strategic element in a number of different economic sectors, as well as - through 
the insights of the economic analysis of law - within the contractual relationships1. Nevertheless, what 
has recently enhanced the debate has to be associated with the emergence of increasingly complex 
technologies able to improve the acquisition, collection, storage and analysis of huge volumes of data, 
which might enable the production on real-time information likely to give a competitive advantage to 
the stakeholders of the knowledge economy2. Alongside the exponential growth of the computational 
capacity, also the increase of Internet access has contributed to the development of the digital economy 
and to the adoption of business models based on the treatment of large volumes of data3. In other words: 
personal information, including in particular those concerning consumers habits, have acquired an 
enormous value in the digital environment, qualifying - as noted by Howard Shelanski4 - as essential 
inputs for the competitive success. Not by chance, the examples of products, services or business models 
that are usually made in this regard range between the champions of digital capitalism, obviously 
                                                     
1  See C. Shapiro, H. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Harvard Business Review Press, 
1999. 
2  H. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics, in «Journal of Economic Perspectives», 28, 2014, at p. 3. 
3  In this respect see OECD, New Forms of Work in the Digital Economy, DSTI/ICCP/IIS(2015)13/FINAL, June 2016; A. 
Lerner, The Role of 'Big Data' in Online Platform Competition, (2014), available online at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482780; in the management literature consult P. Tambe, “Big Data 
Investment, Skills, and Firm Value”, in «Management Science», 60(6), 2014, p. 1452. 
4  H. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet,  in «University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review», 161, 2013, at p. 1688. 
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including Google, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft and Uber. This is why the generic term «Big Data» 
has progressively get out from the computer science domain to monopolise also other academic fields, 
including the political and regulatory ones. 
That being said, the same definitional effort has proven to be not an easy task, ranging between those 
who were more inclined to value features as the collection and (more or less automated) processing of 
Big Data; and others conversely more favourable to value the type of content embedded therein. 
However, it seems that over time a qualification focused on specific characteristics of Big Data has 
emerged. Four in particular: volume, velocity, variety and value (summarized as the «4 Vs»). As for the 
first terms - volume and velocity - it has been noted that the growth of online activities, together with 
the widespread use of smartphones and Internet platforms, have displayed an exponential increase in the 
data produced, with annual estimates of growth around 25 per cent. The exact amount, in terms of 
zettabytes, still seems to escape the most accurate appraisals, but there is no doubt that this impressive 
amount of data allows firms to identify essential information of their customers: age, gender, 
geographical location, demographic profile, family composition, eating habits, biometric data, business 
preferences, spending capacity and (many) other5. Obviously, the ability to quickly acquire and process 
these volumes of data, hence the speed feature, increases the release of accurate information, useful also 
to profile (if not even foresee) the services, products and offers to be addressed to consumers. Moreover, 
the aggregation is operated through a myriad of different sources, here lies the variety, in which the user 
can be an active source of data and information – it is the case of Facebook or WhatsApp - or retrieved 
through complex computer equipment, programs and algorithms. As a consequence, all these 
characteristics make data aggregations acquiring value. Even in the case of raw data that, as a result of 
different analysis and processing, allow to extract relevant information useful for different purposes6.  
In a nutshell, it is on these four characteristics that a consensus has been reached, which is useful not 
only for what concerns the definitional effort of this phenomenon (some scholars rely on a slightly 
different number of characteristics)7, but also to emphasize that within the meaning of Big Data have 
necessarily to be included the huge amount of data, but also the ability to operate their acquisition and 
the processes necessary to allow their use. Finally, it is even less questioned that Big Data represents a 
strategic input, which is increasingly being recognised8, also on the institutional side, as the new 
currency of the new millennium. 
The economic debate, between benefits and risks 
Faced with the growing awareness on the importance of this matter, many scholars, primarily 
economists, have deservedly committed themselves to scrutinise Big Data with a view to emphasize the 
benefits and risks, also the competitive ones, which they are likely to generate. The endeavour, that is 
still in progress, has proved to be particularly useful not only for academic purposes but also to interpret 
the terms of a debate sometimes polarized between overly different views. In other words, between those 
who are more inclined to see the phenomenon as an aggregation of economic power able to raise antitrust 
concerns, to reduce the consumer welfare, and even affect the democratic nature of the different legal 
systems9. And who, conversely, is more willing to recognise the benefits in terms of innovation and 
                                                     
5  OECD, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era, DAF/COMP(2016)14, 27-Oct-2016, at p. 5 ff. 
6  M. Stucke, A. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy, Oxford University Press, 2016, at p. 15 ff. 
7  See, for instance, D. Rubinfeld, M. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, in «Arizona Law Review», 59, 2017, at p. 339, the 
authors add another V, the veracity, which indicates the data accuracy, at p. 348. 
8  M. Vestager, Competition in a Big Data World, Speech, Munich, 17 January 2016, available online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-big-data world_en. 
9  This possibility had been strongly advanced by R. Epstein, R. Robertson, The Search Engine Manipulation Effect (SEME) 
and its Possible Impact on the Outcomes of Elections, in «Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences», 112(33), 
2015, p. E4512. 
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economic growth. In the impossibility to reproduce here the theoretical debate, it is presumably useful 
to critically review the results of the different approaches. 
The perceived strengths of Big Data 
As for the potential positive effects, the collection and processing of large amount of data might increase 
the level of innovation and bring significant efficiency gains. Firms, especially those active on-line, use 
data to improve the quality of products and services or to develop new ones (process commonly 
identified as data-driven innovation10). In this regard, for instance, it has been emphasized that search 
engines, through the use of advanced algorithms, are able to offer users ever-increasing accurate or high 
added value results. The analysis of the type of research carried out by end-users allows proposing offers 
fine-tuned around the user preferences, informing consumers about price trends (as is the case of search 
engines for travels); developing additional services (traffic information and translation services, based 
on user data and on their activities to increase the quality); or for other added value services usually 
valued by users11. 
Furthermore, and this is possibly the most obvious benefit (with a consequence that will be evaluated in 
while), many of the services offered in the Big Data environment are provided without requiring any 
cash payment to users, if not to almost a symbolic rate. The wide success of social platforms (Facebook), 
messaging applications (WhatsApp) or even search engines (Google) is due to the fact that the several 
billions of people using them daily ‘just’ give their consent to allow firms to use their data, often on 
different sides of the market. The possibility to monetize personal data allows to subsidize the supply of 
goods and services generally free of charge. According to some scholars, this model – obviously 
appreciated by users – would not even raise any antitrust concern. In a period in which the consumer 
welfare is matched with the definition of low prices, it is clear that prices and tariffs close to zero might 
be perceived (even in the most refined elaborations) as positive elements in terms of consumer welfare. 
In this perspective, the various counter-arguments, aimed at making the way less challenging to 
competitors, have sometimes appeared less popular. A prohibition on the collection, processing or 
commercial use of data would presumably increase the price of products and services for the consumers, 
with uncertain results that this solution would enhance the competition from rival firms12. Furthermore, 
it has been noted that data are often non-rivalrous; for some observers, they are also unlikely to create 
insurmountable barriers to entry (especially if the data is in the public domain)13; and in any case they 
are often freely released by users. Whether there is full rationality (or, according to the legal meaning, 
that the consent is really informed) is another issue, precisely with a view to freely benefit form goods 
and services14. 
Lastly, just to mention other widely credited benefits, the use of Big Data is considered able to increase 
the efficiency of production processes, improve the decision-making ability of managers, to more 
accurately predict market trends and to address in a much more targeted way (and therefore more 
efficiently) the same advertising. Although it is difficult to make accurate estimates in terms of overall 
cost savings associated with the use of Big Data, the OECD assessments indicate that by 2020 there will 
                                                     
10  OECD, Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being, Interim Synthesis Report, October 2015.  
11  M. Salinger, R. Levinson, Economics and the FTC's Google Investigation, in «Review of Industrial Organization», 46(1), 
2015, p. 25. 
12  This is the point made by T. Korber, Common Errors Regarding Search Engine Regulation - and How to Avoid Them, in 
«European Competition Law Review», 36(6), 2015, p. 239. 
13  On this, A. Lambrecht, C. Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firm from Competition?, 2015, available online at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705530; also, in relation to market power, N. Schepp, A. Wambach, 
On Big Data and its Relevance for Market Power Assessment, in «Journal of European Competition Law & Practice», 7(2), 
2016, p. 121. 
14  Amplius, A. Lerner, The Role of "Big Data" in Online Platform Competition, 2014, available online at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2482780. 
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be benefits in the transport sector (smartphone data show global savings of around 500 billion euros); 
in the consumption of electricity (with benefits in terms of costs for users and pollution for hundreds of 
billions euros) or in the health sector (with savings - at least those measurable - of about 300 billion 
euros)15. All this would also be functional to boost economic growth that for the European Union alone 
is equal to an additional 1.9% per year within the next three years16. It is thus clear, also on the basis of 
a summary appraisal, that the phenomenon might positively affect many parties, yielding considerable 
benefits to consumers, firms and in terms of economic growth. 
Foreclosure concerns and other antitrust risks 
On the other hand, similar convincing reasons have emerged to point out - albeit with different emphasis 
- the risks for consumers, competitors and other subjects deriving from the use of Big Data. In this 
regard, a number of studies underlining the ways in which firms might use aggregations of data to 
acquire an (illegal) competitive advantage, distort the competitive level and harm consumers, have often 
started from the analysis of the technological platforms. The line of reasoning has frequently relied on 
the assumption that the market power held by the champions of the digital arena - the discourse is usually 
referred to Google, Facebook, Amazon and other primary stakeholders - is able to foster highly 
concentrated markets, scarcely contestable, and likely to pave the way to several anti-competitive 
infringements17. With the additional risk that this power is exercised on another side of the market (with 
the well-known effects and debated operational difficulties at stake)18. 
In this regard, the ways in which the market power is acquired and maintained represent the first issues 
that have been scrutinized with some suspicion. Indeed, the most recent studies on the value chain in the 
Big Data ecosystem have highlighted that there are several barriers potentially able to create a durable 
market power in many contexts of the supply chain, likely to the appearance of different anticompetitive 
conducts. A first barrier, the technological one, is that the possibilities of acquisition of (some types of) 
data may not be easily replicated by competitors. But it has also been displayed that the cost structure 
in these sectors is often characterized by high economies of scale and scope, able to induce concentration 
among few subjects in the Big Data environment19. The technological and human resources necessary 
for the collection, storage and analysis of data require high fixed costs and low marginal costs. In this 
scenario, the use of data allows to improve one’s business model (on some of the different sides), making 
it more difficult for rivals to emulate or challenge broadly structured and established firms. Further 
barriers can be associated with the network effects that usually occur within the technological platforms. 
Whenever the quality of products or services depends on the data collected, and the quality of the latter 
is in turn linked to the number of subjects that provide them, it can be extremely difficult for potential 
rivals not to only to win a competitive battle, but also to have some chance of entering the market20. The 
list is much longer - there are also legal barriers (i.e. the different personal data regimes) or behavioural 
                                                     
15  OECD, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era, DAF/COMP(2016)14, 27-Oct-2016, at p. 8. 
16  The estimation (used also by OECD, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era, cit.) is provided by S. 
Buchholtz, M. Bukowski, A. Sniegocki (2014), Big and Open Data in Europe - A Growth Engine or a Missed Opportunity?, 
available online at: https://www.microsoft.com/global/eu/RenderingAssets/pdf/2014%20Jan%2028%20EMEA 
%20Big%20and%20Open%20Data%20Report%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf, at p. 17 ff. 
17  A particularly detailed analysis on these risks is carried out by A. Ezrachi, M. Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise 
and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy, Harvard University Press, 2016. 
18  V. D. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among On-line Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust Analysis, in «Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics», 9, 2013, at p. 313.   
19  On this aspect, The Economist, A Giant Problem - The Rise of the Corporate Colossus Threatens Both Competition and the 
Legitimacy of Business, September 17, 2016, available online at: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21707210-rise-
corporate-colossus-threatens-both-competition-and-legitimacy-business. 
20  R. Mahnke, Big Data as a Barrier to Entry, in «CPI Antitrust Chronicles», 2015, available online at: 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/big-data-as-a-barrier-to-entry. 
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ones - but the element that emerges is that all these factors seem leading to a marked concentration of 
economic power in the availability of few subjects - labelled as dominant super-platforms - able to shield 
their position and potentially encouraged to adopt different anti-competitive conducts21.  
It is precisely in relation to the second aspect, the unlawful practices, that the story has over time revealed 
a wide ranging list of anticompetitive injuries. Some authors have pointed out that the same innovative 
process might be damaged. Firms basing their commercial success on the acquisition and use of data 
would have the incentive to adopt strategies aimed at preventing or restricting to competitors the 
possibility of obtaining the same information, thus limiting the ability to innovate and compete with the 
incumbent22. But the same outcome, has also been stressed, might be achieved whenever new entrants 
are acquired with the aim of accessing their portfolio of data or to limit the possibilities of growth in the 
market. In both cases, the innovative degree would be presumably reduced. Other scholars have also 
highlighted that the anti-competitive use of Big Data could reduce the quality of products offered and 
services provided. The argument has often been evoked in relation to search engines. The more 
structured subjects would derive the incentive to use the users data to extract profits (at least) on another 
side of the market, the advertising one. They would therefore be inclined to prioritize the results of the 
advertisers', to the detriment of search results characterized by higher quality for the end-users. 
However, the argument goes (often referred to Google), the competitors would not have in any case the 
possibility to offer a sufficient level of quality to force the incumbent not to reduce its offer in order to 
obtain a higher income from another side of the platform23.  
More generally, the views aimed at highlighting the anticompetitive effects have emphasised that the 
damage associated with the misuse of Big Data can occur on all sides of the supply chain, both upstream 
and downstream. It is also in this respect that multi-sided platforms are often taken into account as virtual 
places where exchanges are done between different agents. Part of the scholars has thus noted that the 
analysis of this complex context in a welfare perspective cannot be limited to the mere acknowledgement 
that consumers often obtain services without paying an amount of money. A more careful analysis must 
take into account at least other two elements. The first is represented by the fact that the huge amount 
of data provided by users is able to produce - once processed - different and subtle discriminatory 
practices. Moreover, and it is the second significant aspect, the data protection is in this case at risk 
because users, once releasing the data, no longer have the real possibility of exercising some control in 
the digital arena, which consequently acquire the appearance of a public good24. Moreover, it is often 
argued that users continue to use these services ‘for free’ because there are no substitutes and are 
therefore forced to pay for them making their personal data available or accessible by firms25. The 
network and lock-in effects would do the rest, fuelling the vicious circle. Finally, the negative effects 
would occur also upstream, in relation to the group of subjects interacting on the different platforms. In 
this case, the platform owners would exercise market power to realise the most classic form of 
discrimination, set high prices (aware of the difficulty or impossibility to be found guilty in an antitrust 
perspective) or adopt various predatory strategies (let us think to the E-books case), consequently 
creating significant competitive concerns to the subjects placed upstream in the supply chain26.  
                                                     
21  D. Rubinfeld, M. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, cit., at p. 359 ff. 
22  D. Sokol, R. Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, in «George Mason Law Review», 23, 2016, at p. 1149 ff. 
23  M. Stucke, A. Ezrachi, When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines, in «Yale Journal of Law 
and Technology», 18, 2016, at p. 103. 
24  Amplius, A. Acquisti, From the Economics of Privacy to the Economics of Big Data, in S. Bender et al. (eds.), Privacy, Big 
Data, and the Public Good, Cambridge University Press, 2014, at p. 76 ff. 
25  M. Gal, D. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, in «Antitrust Law Journal», 
80(3), 2016, at 521. Similarly, M. Stucke, A. Grunes, Dancing Around Data, The Hill, 2014, disponibile online a: 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/226502-dancing-around-data. 
26  On these issues M. Stucke, A. Ezrachi, Looking Up in the Data-Driven Economy, 2017, available online at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2975510. 
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As it is evident, at least on theoretical grounds, a significant part of the competitive discourse has 
therefore analysed the conditions through which companies can use Big Data to preserve an unjustified 
competitive advantage, necessary to adopt several strategies potentially harmful for all the subjects of 
the supply chain, for the same competitive process, in terms of privacy protection and, ultimately, for 
what concerns the total welfare.   
The uncertain regulation of Big Data, between competition, consumer protection and 
privacy 
The terms of a complex debate have obviously affected the role that competition law and authorities 
(but also the regulatory and data protection ones) have to play in dealing with Big Data. Also in this 
regard the scholars have exhibited a marked disagreement. From the one side, many observers place the 
antitrust enforcement in a sort of residual limbo. The reasons have to be found in the benefits, previously 
mentioned, stemming from the aggregation, processing and use of data. However, there are also other 
reasons. In a general perspective, it has been noted that the hypotheses of harm to competition resulting 
from an exclusionary conduct are not (to date) based on strong theories, as rather on general 
perspectives, devoid of factual evidence, which are used in relation to the new environment. It was also 
argued, also to discredit the assessments aimed at advocating a more prominent antitrust role, that the 
track record of anti-competitive infringements linked to Big Data is limited; or that there are not class 
actions brought by users, especially in the US, for damages incurred as a result of the misuse of data. A 
further argument, often employed in the digital world, concerns the particular attention that must be 
placed in relation to markets characterized by innovation and fast technological change. Line of 
reasoning that suggests to deter the antitrust intervention due to risks of false positives, with negative 
effects on consumer welfare and on the same innovative degree in hyper-dynamic contexts27. 
This only part of the story. If the aforementioned reasons have sometimes appeared to be characterised 
by some laissez-faire attitude or by a Chicagoan approach, more exhaustive assessments have been 
released to emphasise the extreme difficulty that the competition law tools exhibit in dealing with the 
phenomenon. Starting from the definition of the relevant market, where the SSNIP test is of little use if 
it is employed in markets with several sides and whenever non-monetary transactions are in place28. The 
same assessment of market power proves to be difficult whenever companies offer ‘free’ services to 
consumers in exchange for the use of their personal data. In these instances, it is usually noted, the 
market power may be underestimated by the authorities and the market might seem unsuitable to create 
any anticompetitive concern. In this scenario, the availability of huge amounts of personal data is not 
often perceived as a crucial element able to attribute, consolidate or unlawfully exercise market power; 
while the use of personal data (for anti-competitive purposes) is sometimes too easily excluded from the 
antitrust risks and considered to be regulated exclusively through the data protection domain.    
Finally, even for what concerns the remedies it has been expressed some scepticism. In the event that 
the data possessed by the dominant firm were qualified as an essential resource, the discussion would 
be resolutely point towards the related doctrine and, therefore, in the direction of the duty to deal (and 
disclose the data) with the competitors29. But in these circumstances, besides the difficulty in 
implementing a rather discredited measure, certainly in the US post-Trinko30, the remedy could even 
                                                     
27  A. Lerner, The Role of "Big Data" in Online Platform Competition, cit. at p. 6 ff.    
28  On this problem see for instance L. Filistrucchi, D. Geradin, E.  Damme, P. Affeldt, Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: 
Theory and Practice, in «Journal of Competition, Law & Economics», 10(2), 2014, p. 293. 
29  See D. Geradin, M. Kuschewsky, Competition Law and Personal Data: Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue, 2013, 
available online at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2216088, at p. 13 ff. 
30  V. A. Giannaccari, R. Van den Bergh, Unilateral Conduct of Dominant Firms, in R. Van den Bergh, P. Camesasca, A. 
Giannaccari, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, 2017, at p. 300 ff.  
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worsen the problems concerning privacy since the users to whom the data refer would presumably not 
have given any consent to their treatment by other subjects31. 
To these (and other) reasons are usually opposed those advocating a more penetrating (and severe) 
antitrust control. As previously noted, the potential negative effects concern both the ways in which 
companies create these huge aggregations of data - making the same process sometimes impossible for 
the competitors (actual or potential) - and also the exercise of market power through unlawful schemes. 
What has to be pointed out, apart from the several details, is that the discourse has progressively affected 
all the illegal conducts32. For what concerns the abuses, in addition to the already mentioned hypotheses, 
it has been highlighted that dominant firms might adopt illegal practices to prevent or limit that other 
subjects access the data, in order to get an unfair competitive advantage. There is the case of the 
vertically integrated dominant company that uses the data acquired upstream to obtain a benefit at the 
distribution level, preventing downstream competitors from accessing the same information. Or, the 
dominant company that relies on the typical leverage through bundling or tying strategies: the 
aggregation of data on one side of the market can in fact be instrumental to achieve, maintain or increase 
the market power elsewhere. Finally, and this is the case of the procedure by the Bundeskartellamt 
against Facebook, the abusive conduct can take the (innovative) form of imposing users’ unlawful terms 
and conditions (under the privacy law) in the process of acquisition of their personal data33.  
In postponing the analysis of merger cases, Big Data can also stimulate cartels, facilitate collusion and 
price coordination. In this regard, it has been extensively observed that the sharing of Big Data, of 
complex algorithms and of artificial intelligence devices between two or more firms can be used to 
define and adjust (identical) prices on the market, facilitate tacit collusion and timely monitor the 
compliance with an agreement34. Lastly, the way in which the antitrust rules should eventually include 
data protection claims have surfaced. In other words, in what circumstances the competition regime 
might solve issues concerning end-users privacy; and how, more generally, the competition domain 
should deal with strategies involving  the use of personal data when they are aimed at illegally bias the 
competitive degree. Obviously, while it has been frequently argued that the competition law is called to 
serve different aims, there have been (even institutional) opposite views.  
Among the others, on the EU side, it has been the same European Data Protection Supervisor that has 
urged to devote attention to the competitive effects of Big Data in all the proceedings, focusing in 
particular on the relationship between personal data, entry barriers and market power35. From a general 
perspective, it is difficult to deny that the decisions of companies, whether or not represented by the 
giants of the web, about the collection and use of personal data, have certainly acquired a noteworthy 
competitive dimension. Whenever Big Data represents a significant input for products and services, or 
if the level of protection offered to users affect the qualitative degree of the marketplace (thus revealing 
an incidence not in terms of price competition but in relation to other components of the consumer 
                                                     
31  A. Goldfarb, C. Tucker, Privacy and Innovation, in J. Lerner, S. Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, University 
of Chicago Press, 2012, p. 65 ff. 
32  For a comprehensive analysis M. Stucke, A. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy, Oxford University Press, 2016. 
33  Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Initiates Proceeding Against Facebook on Suspicion of Having Abused its Market 
Power by Infringing Data Protection Rules, Press Release, 2.03.2016. 
34  Amplius, M. Stucke, A. Ezrachi, Artificial Intelligence and Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2015, available 
online at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591874. 
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choice)36, the antitrust system cannot and should not remain passive37. Rather, the challenge it has to 
face – it is argued by the most cautious voices – is to deal with this huge set of operational problems 
with the due care, avoiding excesses38.  
The terms of the discourse could be extended to all the analysis aimed at discovering a theoretical border 
between the different disciplines at stake – competition law, privacy and consumer protection – which 
are in turn affected by the legal specificities of the different legal systems39. However, the exercise would 
not produce different outcomes in terms of certainties, revealing also in this regard the most disparate 
positions. Confronted with so different perspectives, what can be inferred? First, for the issues of interest 
here, the debate suggests taking particular attention in assessing these issues and in advancing the proper 
solutions. The Big Data phenomenon, it is increasingly noted be the scholars, still requires a precise and 
solid understanding. The level of uncertainty and the lack of knowledge in an area that overlaps different 
disciplines suggest to proceed, by scholars and authorities, with the utmost caution. Furthermore, the 
competitive enforcement is only now taking its first steps. Nonetheless, the lack of an extensive case 
law and of some black letters should not suggest that there is little room for a discipline also historically 
aimed at checking the enormous aggregations of economic power. For all the stakeholders, it is thus 
necessary to reduce the  information asymmetries that characterizes a new and complex phenomenon, 
carefully assessing how to deal with the many concerns that it is likely to raise. And, in this perspective, 
it has to be valued what is slowly surfacing from the application practice. 
Big Data and merger control 
Faced with an uncertain theoretical framework, and missing a meaningful enforcement, there is an area 
- that of mergers - in which Big Data has been repeatedly subjected to antitrust scrutiny. Also in this 
regard, the theoretical debate has allowed to clarify the negative effects associated with the aggregation 
of data pertaining to different companies; but there have analysis aimed at underlining  that the merger 
control has not to take into account issues different form prices and market structure.  
In the case of mergers or acquisitions involving aggregations of data, adverse competitive effects may 
occur and this outcome is likely even if the traditional techniques to control these operations (based on 
the firms market shares) do not indicate an increase in the concentration ratio. For instance, when an 
already well-structured company decides to acquire a new entrant, presumably having a low market 
share, the market structure may not exhibit any significant change. However, whenever the entrant 
disposes of a large amount of data, the transaction could lead to a monopolization (in the access or use) 
of data in one specific market40. Similar concerns might surface when the entity resulting from the 
merger adopt anticompetitive conducts stemming from the aggregation of the firms databases involved 
in the transaction. If the access to this data constitutes an important component for the market 
contestability, competitive risks cannot be ruled out if the aggregation of data is made inaccessible to 
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competitors (actual or potential), or in cases where it is impossible to replicate the data. The same 
outcome could also emerge when there is a willingness to acquire firms located upstream or downstream 
of the supply chain solely to access the flow of user data41.   
Finally, just to remain on the most shared taxonomy, mergers or acquisitions can reduce the non-price 
competition in terms of the lower level of protection offered in the use of personal data. In essence, if 
the privacy acquires a competitive edge in one specific market, or constitutes the economic rationale 
underlying the merger, the invocation addressed to the authorities is to carefully consider whether these 
operations create the conditions (or implement the incentives) so that firms compete in terms of privacy 
protection. Also in this respect, if users consider privacy as a qualifying element of a product or a service, 
any potential decrease in the level of protection resulting from the merger should be perceived in the 
same way as a reduction in the quality of the product or service offered (which is a non-trivial element, 
as it will be observed in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, see infra at §§ 5.2-5.3). In sum, the crucial 
issue was underlined on theoretical grounds by Robert Lande, precisely in relation to the concentrations. 
It is in the acknowledgment that if the competition law concerns consumer choice, this cannot be limited 
to the price dimension. The discipline has to guarantee markets able to release competitive prices, but 
also other forms of non-price competition, such as innovation, quality, variety of products, and also the 
protection of personal data. In other words, the privacy should be considered as an important component 
of the non-price competition, which would lead to the prohibition of an operation whenever it is likely 
to reduce the consumer welfare in relation to this dimension. On the other hand, it cannot be 
underestimated the circumstance that mergers and acquisitions concerning Big Data might increase the 
efficiency, giving the merging parties the ability, in terms of data possessed, to positively affect the 
production of goods, the supply of services or in terms of innovation42. Furthermore, it has to be noted 
that also in relation to the mergers most of the arguments aimed at denying the antitrust regime an 
incisive role have been used, on the assumption that the goal of the discipline has only to be the 
promotion of competition as a mechanism to increase the efficient allocation of resources (interpreted 
as low prices) or relying on the argument that the privacy concerns do not constitute a dimension that 
the competition domain has to take care of. 
The Google/DoubleClick merger 
The first antitrust case concerning Big Data, and the protection of user privacy, is presumably 
represented by the Google’s acquisition (for more than 3 billion dollars) of Double Click, realised in 
2007. At that time, both firms were relevant players in the digital market. Google already represented 
the most important search engine and played a significant role also in the advertising market (with shares 
between 30 and 40% in the EU). Double Click was instead the leading company in the provision of 
online advertising services. Since the two companies had large datasets concerning the users, there were 
repeated invitations to the respective institutions, the Federal Trade Commission and the European 
Commission, to consider in the assessment of the operation risks of privacy infringement and increase 
of the barriers to entry that could have been determined.  
In a nutshell, the greatest concern consisted in the match of data related to the users searches (operated 
on Google search engine) with those of DoubleClick, concerning the monitoring of Internet advertising, 
which was likely to realize an unprecedented aggregation of data. The purchase of DoubleClick, it was 
claimed, would have allowed Google to track the searches made by users and also the pages accessed 
(including, in particular, the commercial ones), allowing it to undertake an accurate users profiling. 
Hence, the invitation – also by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (the authoritative research 
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center on online privacy protection) – to block the merger since Google would not have had any legal 
obligation post-merger to protect the users privacy, guarantee the security of data storage and grant their 
accuracy43. 
Nonetheless, the FTC - with not a unanimous decision - decided to approve the operation, considering 
that the parties were not competitors in any of the relevant markets. In particular, as regards the 
combination of data, it was observed that their aggregation and processing did not constitute, for rivals, 
an insurmountable barrier to entry. The size of competitors - such as Microsoft, Yahoo or AOL - did not 
raise any competitive risk, while it was in any event possible to obtain data similar to those of the parties, 
in terms of quantity and quality, also for other market players. Finally, in terms of damages to users in 
terms of privacy violation, the FTC emphasized that statutory law did not allow to block the merger on 
the basis of concerns different from those typical of the merger control (although recognizing that 
privacy can represent a non-price competition dimension), as well as that it was not possible to impose 
conditions on the firms with a view to protect the users privacy44.  
However, as introduced, the decision was not taken by unanimous vote. Particular emphasis, within the 
debate previously reviewed, has received the opinion released by one of the FTC commissioners, Pamela 
Harbor. In her dissenting statement, the commissioner pointed out the risks of market foreclosure, also 
linked to the network effects, strongly emphasizing that the privacy dimension had necessarily to be 
taken into account in the decision. Thus arguing: «I dissent because I make alternate predictions about 
where this market is heading, and the transformative role the combined Google/DoubleClick will play 
if the proposed acquisition is consummated. If the Commission closes its investigation at this time, 
without imposing any conditions on the merger, neither the competition nor the privacy interests of 
consumers will have been adequately addressed»45. In any case, the FTC did not declare that it did not 
have the authority to intervene if an element such as user privacy was likely to decrease the competitive 
degree, but that in this specific case there was no evidence of such occurrence46. 
A rather similar result was reached in the EU. Unlike the FTC, the Commission decided to focus solely 
on some competitive effects that could arise, thus concluding that no harmful consequences could be 
expected for consumers in the different relevant markets47. Through a similar argument compared to the 
one employed by FTC, it was pointed out that Google would not have had the possibility to restrict or 
exclude other subjects from the markets related to the offer and intermediation of online advertising, 
that the data held by Google could also be found by competitors; and that, conversely, their aggregation 
would have allowed to operate a more targeted advertising towards the users48. However, unlike the 
FTC, the Commission decided not to engage in an assessment of the user privacy, simply stating that 
the decision was aimed, according to the EU liturgy, to assess whether the operation was compatible 
with the objectives of the Regulation on merger control. Affirming to this end that the decision was 
«(…) without prejudice to the obligations imposed onto the parties by Community legislation in relation 
to the protection of individuals and the protection of privacy with regard to the processing of personal 
data»49.  
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Ultimately, the operation was approved in both jurisdictions, refraining to a large extent from clarifying 
in detail the several issues raised by Big Data in the context of mergers, especially for what concerned 
the privacy protection. A circumstance that led some scholars to argue that the case had thus represented 
a «missed opportunity»50.  
The Facebook/WhatsApp merger 
Another significant case is the acquisition by Facebook of WhatsApp, realized in 2014. As known, the 
merger had raised doubts for the sum paid, equal to about 19 billion dollars, but especially because the 
messaging company did not seem to be worth this amount. At the time of the operation, WhatsApp had 
about 450 million users worldwide (Facebook 1.3 billion), but had an annual income of just 20 million 
dollars; it displayed a very small number of employees (a few tens); it did not convey any advertising 
offer; and did not represent a platform for other services. In other words, the acquisition price 
corresponded to a market capitalization of much more structured companies, such as American Airlines 
after the restructuring, and was about twice what had seemed the most expensive purchase made in the 
recent past: the acquisition of Skype by Microsoft in 2011, for 8.5 billion dollars. It was for this reason 
that several judgments substantially agreed that the price was excessively high and the ratio of the 
transaction was not fully understandable51. 
That said, also in this case some concerns had been raised (on competitive grounds and in terms of data 
protection) that were similar to those envisaged in the Google/DoubleClick merger. In particular, besides 
the remarkable aggregation of data that the operation was likely to accomplish, it had been claimed that 
the Facebook business model was different from that employed by WhatsApp in relation to the 
management of personal data. In a nutshell, if the messaging company had assured the protection of 
information and had not engaged any commercial activity, it was conversely alleged that Facebook 
derived from the collection, processing or sale of data (for advertising and other commercial purposes) 
a huge flow of income. Also for these reasons, it was therefore requested the FTC (in particular by 
organizations active in the privacy protection) not to authorize the merger; or, in case it was approved, 
not to make it possible to Facebook to access user data obtained through the service provided by 
WhatsApp52. 
However, following a rather brief preliminary phase, the FTC approved the merger, refraining, as 
traditional in these circumstances, from issuing the consent order to disclose the reasons (or impose 
measures) for the approval. Nevertheless, what has to be noted is that that the day the merger was 
approved, one of the directors of the FTC (for the Bureau of Consumer Protection) sent a letter to the 
parties, underlining the firms duties in relation to the aggregation, storage and use of users data. In 
particular, it was highlighted that Facebook had publicly declared, in announcing the acquisition, that it 
would not have changed the privacy policy of WhatsApp, and it was therefore warned not to change the 
rules concerning the processing of data already held by the company without express consent from the 
users53. Therefore, an approval of the merger, except to intervene on the relevant aspect of personal data 
through a letter, recalling a public ‘assurance’ done by Facebook.  
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A similar outcome was reached in the EU, in October 2014. At the end of phase 1, the European 
Commission decided to clear the merger, stating that the transaction did not raise any competitive risk54. 
Specifically, the Commission highlighted that in none of the three markets affected by the merger - that 
of communication services between users, of the social networking services and those related to online 
advertising - there were risks of reinforcing entry barriers and therefore to restrict or eliminate the 
competition. The cautious Commission’s analysis was based on the premise that the two companies 
were not rivals and that the services offered to users, especially messaging, could be replicated by other 
operators. In this perspective and in a rather surprising way compared to the arguments advanced in 
relation to the different Microsoft cases, the behavioural users component was valued. If in the Microsoft 
saga (both on Internet Explorer and in relation to the Media Player) the Commission had stressed the 
consumers inertia in finding alternative software (the so-called end-user inertia), the Commission was 
in this case inclined to consider the consumers sufficiently equipped to use alternative messaging 
platforms (highlighting the tendency to rely on multiple communication applications on the same device, 
the so-called multihoming), offered by the competitors already active in the market55. Therefore, while 
highlighting that the parties’ market shares could release an ephemeral framework in highly dynamic 
contexts such as the one concerned (in two of the three relevant markets the shares of the parties were 
significant), it was not possible to conclude that the network effects generated by the merger were likely 
to increase the barriers to entry (or ensure an adequate switch of the users).  
According to the Commission, potential anti-competitive concerns in the advertising market were 
similarly missing. In this regard, which is also relevant for what concerns the aggregation of data, it was 
highlighted – relying to some extent on the analysis carried out in relation to Google/DoubleClick – that 
no anticompetitive concerns could arise. Even in the event, argued the Commission, that Facebook had 
used WhatsApp as a vehicle to find more user data, the aggregation would not have been harmful to 
other operators, which retained the ability to detect the consumers behaviour online through alternative 
sources. Furthermore, with regard to risks of data sharing between the two companies, raised by third 
parties during the proceeding, the Commission decided to acknowledge the assurance provided by the 
parties that there were technical barriers to the fulfilment of this possibility56. Finally, in relation to the 
privacy issues, the problem was somehow sidestepped, even in this case relying on the 
Google/DoubleClick argument, by highlighting that «[a]ny privacy-related concerns flowing from the 
increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall 
within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within the scope of the EU data protection rules»57. 
In sum, as for the FTC, an unconditional approval of the merger. Probably, in both cases, 
underestimating the risks previously scrutinised associated with Big Data.  
This is not the end of the case. Two years later, in August 2016, WhatsApp announced the modification 
of the terms of use of the service and in relation to the privacy protection, proposing (among others) the 
ability to match the phone numbers of WhatsApp users with the identity of Facebook ones, also for 
profiling purposes and for commercial use. Proposals that appeared to several observers as the final 
stage of the strategy. Among the first to complain, directly to the parties, against these changes (which 
controverted the public statements issued pending the merger approval to ensure that the data would not 
be shared) was the European Data Protection Supervisor, which sent a letter to the companies asking for 
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clarifications concerning the data sharing with Facebook, on the categories of data processed and on the 
possible transfer to third parties58.  
It was then the turn of the Commission that started a proceeding to (re)assess the case. Already in the 
statement of objections a number of concerns were raised about the fact that the parties had provided 
misleading information during the merger scrutiny as to the technical obstacles to achieve the automatic 
association of user profiles between the two platforms59. However, on 14 March 2017, the Commission 
received a reply from Facebook in which it was merely acknowledged that the information released on 
this specific issue at the time of scrutiny was incorrect and misleading, and that the behaviour of the 
firm had been negligent. The decision of the Commission, issued on July 26, 2017, did not go much 
further than the acknowledgment of the admission of guilt by the firm (which decided not even to present 
request for a hearing)60. In the decision, heavily based on the procedural aspects, it was emphasised that 
the firm was aware at the time of the merger of the possibility of realising the matching of user profiles 
between the two platforms; and that the companies had already identified the technological solutions to 
implement the matching61. Facebook had therefore acted negligently in providing information during 
Phase 1, but also in the letter of reply that it had forwarded to the Commission to clarify the aspects 
concerning the technical integration between the platforms. However, it was reiterated by the 
Commission in the decision and in the press release, this proceeding was undertaken after the merger 
scrutiny, it did not affect the competitive assessment of the transaction, and it was specified that the 
possibilities of integration between the platforms had been in any event taken into account62. Therefore, 
two different infringements were identified. Pursuant to art. 14 of the Merger Regulation (which 
provides for penalties of up to 1% of total turnover) two separate fines were imposed, each equal to 55 
million euros, recognising the gravity of the conduct, slightly mitigated by the cooperation provided by 
the company during the proceeding63. On balance, 110 million euros (amount labelled by Commissioner 
Verstager as «proportionate and deterrent»64), on a global turnover achieved by Facebook in 2016 of 25 
billion euros: 0.44%. 
The Italian case: AGCM v. WhatsApp 
The EU case has also been scrutinised in Italy. In October 2016, the AGCM started the proceeding 
against WhatsApp to assess the possible violation of the Consumer Code, on the assumption that the 
changes made to the terms of use of the messaging application (aimed at sharing with Facebook some 
users data) represented an unfair commercial practice.  
In the decision it was first noted, contrary to the defence brought by the company, that personal data of 
WhatsApp users had a significant economic value as their sharing between the two platforms allowed 
Facebook to improve its business activity, in terms of user profiling and for advertising purposes65. In 
particular, it was stated that the modification of the terms of use represented an aggressive conduct, 
characterized by an undue consumer conditioning. This was due to the fact that users had been forced 
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to fully accept the new contractual terms and led to believe that in case of non-acceptance they would 
have been unable to use the application and their account would have been removed by the company.  
To a closer look, it was argued in the decision, the contractual terms gave users the possibility not to 
agree to the sharing of data with Facebook, but this option had not been properly highlighted and did 
not appear in the main screen concerning the terms of use, but only in subsequent ones. Basically and 
relying to some extent on the findings of the EU decision, it was concluded that «(...) users, in exchange 
for services, were forced to give their consent, which includes the sharing of data with Facebook, that is 
wider than what is necessary to continue using the application»66. In sum, the practice implemented by 
WhatsApp had therefore to be considered unfair, contrary to the professional diligence and likely to 
mislead users behaviour. Furthermore, the conduct was characterized by gravity as it involved the 
sharing and use of relevant personal data with a significant commercial value. For these reasons, 
according to art. 27 of the Consumer Code (which provides for the application of fines ranging between 
5,000 and 5 million euro), the amount of the fine was set at 3 million euro (slightly lower than the base 
amount as the firm had decided to discontinue the data sharing with Facebook). 
To conclude and refraining from providing the percentages of the fine with respect to the firm turnover, 
it seems reasonable just to ask whether, given the substance and the rationale that had inspired the 
concentration, we dispose of the appropriate devices (in the Italian case it has been relied on the 
consumer protection) to address the critical issues which might be determined by Big Data. 
Final remarks 
The choice to analyse in this way the Big Data phenomenon is certainly an unconventional decision. As 
has been observed even through this exercise, the several issues affected are likely to shake the 
foundations of different disciplines, create problems in terms of operational choices and challenge many 
economic and legal arguments. Nonetheless, the attempt is maybe useful at least to draw the attention 
on some fundamental aspects.  
First, the academic debate has certainly contributed to reduce the information asymmetry in relation to 
a phenomenon, and to its underlying business models, which are extremely complex. However, although 
some consensus has been reached for what concerns the definitional efforts and in terms of benefits and 
risks associated with Big Data, there still remains a substantial knowledge gap, which certainly 
contributes to the emergence of overly diversified positions. Therefore, the first and perhaps not entirely 
obvious insight is to deal with these set of issues proceeding with the utmost caution, avoiding to rely 
exclusively on theoretical contributions, which could prove to be misleading when confronted with the 
enforcement practice.  
In this perspective, also the competition discourse has proven to be characterised by a number of 
extremely diversified perspectives, ranging from those considering the competition rules as fundamental 
tools to deal with the phenomenon or, conversely, as a residual domain which has not to address 
concerns that must be solved by other disciplines. Also in this regard, besides the fact that the boundaries 
between competition, privacy and consumer protection (beyond the legal specificities of the different 
legal systems) are rather uncertain, it seems difficult to deny a leading role for the competition discipline. 
Rather, the aspect that seems to emerge is represented by the difficulty of translating and appropriately 
consider the Big Data phenomenon through settled schemes and within the different competition rules. 
It is certainly a difficult task, to start with for the institutions responsible to control the market. But the 
choice to not recognize a crucial role to the competition law or to underestimate the enforcement would 
risk dismissing the ability to cope with the infringements that can arise in the digital arena, and far more 
importantly - given the magnitude of the stakeholders - the same ability to deal with a huge market 
power.  
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The aggregation and use of large databases have acquired a crucial economic significance, which does 
not seem correct to assess only with the privacy or consumer protection domains. For the firms, the 
access to these data (obviously, with some user consent) represents the compensation for the ‘free’ use 
of goods and services. But it is able to attribute a huge market power, undermine the competitive offer 
on dimensions other than price, restrict or eliminate the access to the market to other parties, and raise 
a number of other  anticompetitive concerns. That all this can be dealt with through the (weaker) rules 
on consumer protection and privacy appears at least as a sub-optimal outcome, especially if the argument 
is that consumers have the opportunity to take advantage of zero prices, intended as the highest possible 
achievement of the market.  
In this regard, the merger cases briefly reviewed seems to provide further insights. First, the just 
mentioned difficulties seem to have characterized the different proceedings, which have sometimes 
embodied an excessively cautious approach in considering the possible negative effects stemming form 
Big Data. It is significant that in all cases, both in the US and in the EU, privacy supervisors or 
organizations involved in the data protection have urged the competition authorities and institutions to 
block the mergers, or to devote the utmost attention to the (anti-competitive) effects that the use of data 
could determine. Furthermore, the Facebook/WhatsApp case seems to have clearly provided an answer 
to those questioning the value of the operation. It might in fact be argued that the sum paid was the 
purchase price of a company holding significant personal information, estimated by Facebook at 19 
billion dollars. In this respect, the Commission does not seem to have paid enough attention to the 
rationale of the operation (although it stressed to have carried out an even-if analysis taking into account 
the possibility), proposing an analysis aimed at highlighting that the parties were not horizontal 
competitors, and simply relying on the firm assurances that it was not technically possible to implement 
the integration between the platforms.  
Furthermore, even the subsequent proceeding concerning the misleading information has not appeared 
so crucial, certainly not for the Commission’s responsibility. On the contrary, this is the first case, after 
the revision of the Merger Regulation of 2004 (which increased the fine concerning false information, 
from a maximum of 50,000 euros to 1% of global turnover), in which the Commission enforced art. 14 
to sanction an unlawful behaviour. And it has also to be welcomed the AGCM decision to open a 
proceeding at the national level. However, all this seems not enough to balance the feeling that the 
economic terms of the merger have been underestimated, not valuing in perspective which was the 
outcome that the parties were willing to achieve. And it is also significant that, once the terms of the 
service have been changed, the firm has decided to refrain from defending its behaviour. A circumstance 
that in turn leads to question whether the fines that might be imposed, at both the EU and national levels, 
are really able to enhance the (general and specific) deterrence.  
To conclude, it is certainly difficult to release any conclusive assessment in relation to a phenomenon 
that still deserves a solid understanding and which seems to pose more doubts than the insights it is able 
so far to reveal. In any event, it seems important to continue analysing its evolution, in spite of the few 
Likes that a more marked competition enforcement should eventually receive from the industrial sector 
(or by a part of the scholarly community). 
 
  
 
